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A RESPONSE TO SMITH’S 
“CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: 
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR A HEALTHY SUBDISCIPLINE”
Bruce Ellis Benson
All of us working in continental philosophy of religion can be grateful to 
James K. A. Smith for his call to consider which practices will best further the 
“health” of the burgeoning subdiscipline of continental philosophy of reli-
gion. Given that he offers his suggestions “in the spirit of ‘conversation start-
ers,’” my response is designed to continue what I hope will be an ongoing 
conversation. With that goal in mind, I respond to Smith by considering not 
only the practicality of each suggestion but also whether adopting practices 
he suggests would actually improve the health of the subdiscipline.
That “continental philosophy of religion” has finally arrived at the stage 
of development at which it would seem that a review of best practices is 
in order is truly a cause for celebration. It was not all that long ago when 
the phrase “continental philosophy of religion” would have sounded odd. 
It was not that there were no continental philosophers writing from an 
explicitly religious perspective. For instance, the Protestant philosopher 
Paul Ricoeur had published The Symbolism of Evil already in 1960 and 
the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas’s landmark text Totality and 
Infinity appeared in 1961. Of course, Levinas spent most of his academic 
career in positions on the margins of academic life, receiving a position 
at the Sorbonne only at the end of his teaching career (1973–1976) and 
receiving serious attention in the US only about a decade later. Although 
Michel Henry published The Essence of Manifestation in 1963, in the US his 
work has become known only in the past few years. Jean-Luc Marion’s 
The Idol and Distance appeared in 1977 and then God without Being in 1982, 
but his reputation developed in the US during the 90s. Yet, by the time 
Dominique Janicaud published his official report on the state of French 
philosophy from 1975–1990 (The Theological Turn in French Phenomenology) 
in 1991, phenomenology was clearly the dominant mode of philosophy in 
France and, from Janicaud’s point of view, French phenomenology had 
been theologically “corrupted” by the likes of Levinas, Henry, Marion, 
and Jean-Louis Chrétien—one Jew and three Christians. Even other phi-
losophers are usually quite shocked when I mention that (arguably) the 
most prominent living French philosopher—Jean-Luc Marion—is a con-
servative Roman Catholic.
James K. A. Smith’s point, of course, is that such growth in the field of 
continental philosophy of religion is even broader and deeper than that. 
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And such is a development that is both truly significant and worthy of 
examination. Since considering the ways in which any discipline works is 
always an instructive practice and absolutely necessary for its health, one 
cannot help but welcome Smith’s call to think through our modus operandi. 
To quote him, Smith offers “an anecdotal diagnosis of the field” and then 
goes on to “suggest some practices in response.” “Both,” he adds, “are of-
fered in the spirit of ‘conversation starters.’”1 Thus, what follows is some 
conversation in return that is likewise somewhat—though not totally—
anecdotal, due both to the nature of Smith’s suggestions and to the lack 
of anything like a scientific study of current practices. Although I have 
points of difference with Smith regarding the success of particular prac-
tices and how exactly to make them better, I am fully in agreement with 
the underlying concerns and aspirations. For the sake of simplicity and 
clarity, I will respond to each of his suggestions in turn.
To begin with his first suggestion, one can hardly quibble with any call 
for the training of future continental philosophers of religion to be “rigor-
ous, pluralistic, and rooted in the history of philosophy.” All of these are 
uncontestable desiderata. As it turns out, many schools that particularly 
emphasize continental philosophy (Boston College, Fordham University, 
the University of Leuven—to name a few) simply do not allow graduates 
to get through without a heavy dose of the entire history of philosophy. As 
to “a propensity to retreat to enclaves, and an ironic hostility to difference 
and critique,” here it may be uncomfortable to name names, but such is 
none the less necessary in order to determine whether such a “propensity” 
exists. Smith speaks specifically of his own training as being “exclusively 
‘continental,’” so it would seem as if he has in mind either his M.Phil. from 
the Institute for Christian Studies or his Ph.D. from Villanova University 
(or both). From what I am able to gather regarding their respective curri-
cula, it would seem neither institution has a particularly strong emphasis 
on analytic philosophy. However, if I follow Smith’s lead and speak from 
my own experience, what I discovered as a graduate student at Leuven 
was that the analytic/continental divide simply didn’t exist: there was 
just good and bad philosophy. While in the US it would be unusual to 
find an analytic philosopher of language who was equally well versed in 
continental philosophy of language, the professor at Leuven who taught 
Wittgenstein as mediated by Saul Kripke saw nothing ironic about the 
fact that he was also a good friend of Jacques Derrida and highly admired 
Derrida’s work.
The reality in the US is that it is quite difficult to find programs that 
attempt to balance the two traditions. Such schools as Fordham, Chicago, 
and Emory try to do that. To be sure, one could probably add some other 
names to this list, but it would still be a relatively short list. However, 
this problem cuts a number of ways. On the one hand, most prestigious 
universities in the United States simply do not have a significant conti-
nental presence in their philosophy departments (though they may well 
have one in their literary theory or religion departments). Perhaps they 
have a “token” continental philosopher (one specializing in Husserl seems 
often to be preferred, since both Husserl’s concerns and argumentation 
1Quoted from Smith’s footnote fourteen.
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are similar to that of analytic philosophers), but that is the extent of the 
“continental presence.” On the other hand, there are programs that are 
largely continental that have the inverse “token” analytic philosopher or 
two. Although Smith seems to have this latter sort in mind as being “en-
clavish” and “insular,” it must be admitted (if one is to be fair) that the 
same is often true of the former. The only difference is that, since “analytic 
philosophy” is “mainstream” in English-speaking countries, philosophy 
departments in such countries wouldn’t consider themselves “enclavish.” 
I am greatly in favor of avoiding any kind of philosophical insularity and 
routinely recommend to my students that they learn the language/tech-
niques of both traditions. Of course, one must also recognize that really 
being willing to engage both traditions is hardly easy. The two traditions 
definitely overlap in important ways, yet each has its jargon, its figures, 
and its problems or themes. This is a reality to be navigated, though, not 
somehow simply willed away.
As to suggestion two—moving from edited collections to peer-reviewed 
journals—here it is helpful to consider how edited volumes come into ex-
istence. Many are the fruit of conferences in which either a) the papers 
are first vetted for the conference or b) the speakers are invited because 
they are recognized as superior scholars in their respective fields. In the 
first case, papers are effectively vetted twice (at the time of acceptance for 
the conference and at the time when the resulting manuscript is sent to 
reviewers).2 In the second case, it is expected that the invited speakers will 
produce a paper that is fully worthy of being published. In the relatively 
rare case in which such a paper does not meet proper standards, the edi-
tor of the volume will ask the contributor to revise the piece until it does. 
Then there is the manuscript review, at which time a paper may be either 
singled out for revision or else simply dropped. Of course, there are other 
ways in which edited volumes come into existence, such as when an edi-
tor puts together a collection of papers on a selected topic. Normally, the 
invited writers have (again) an established reputation and the resulting 
volume still has to withstand the rigors of peer-review.
Smith should acknowledge that there is a spectrum of how tightly 
things are controlled. He says that “such collections tend to be repetitions 
of the usual suspects.” First, I do not see how this is a “problem.” It only 
stands to reason that edited volumes are going to be dominated by 1) 
scholars who are particularly expert in their field and 2) such names that 
will ensure the volumes sell (which is a crucial consideration is today’s 
2Consider the following example: For the Society for Continental Philosophy 
and Theology conference on prayer that led to the volume The Phenomenology of 
Prayer (Fordham University Press, 2005) we received forty-three papers. Given the 
format of a day and a half conference with only plenary sessions and two keynote 
speakers, my colleague Norman Wirzba and I were able to accept only seven pa-
pers (a 16% acceptance rate), and the decision was made by way of blind review. 
After the conference, we put together a manuscript that included a few of the pa-
pers that couldn’t be accepted for the conference. Then we sent that manuscript to 
the press and waited for the readers’ reports. Although the readers did not require 
extensive changes, there were still revisions that were required for publication. So 
the papers were effectively peer-reviewed at two different stages.
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market).3 Moreover, if this tendency is truly a problem, then it is one that 
is a problem for edited volumes in general. Indeed, a quick glance at edited 
volumes put out by “analytic” philosophers of religion confirms this same 
“usual suspect” tendency.
Yet, having said that, I am also not sure that turning to peer-reviewed 
articles necessarily “fixes” this “problem.” For there are at least three dif-
ficulties with this suggestion. First, philosophical journals themselves 
represent quite a spectrum in terms of quality and percentage of articles 
accepted. Like edited volumes, some are quite selective, while others ac-
cept a very high percentage of papers submitted. Second, journals them-
selves are sometimes “enclavish” and “repetitions of the usual suspects” 
(or “repetitions of the usual subjects”). To cite an example quite removed 
from philosophy of religion, the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
(JAAC) tends to be dominated by a group of “usual suspects.” JAAC is a 
particularly useful example for it demonstrates certain features common 
to both aesthetics and continental philosophy of religion—1) a limited 
number of people working in this specialty (which makes it at least seem 
“enclavish” and thus dominated by the “usual suspects”) and 2) the fact 
that people writing for the journal and the people reviewing the submis-
sions tend to be more or less the same group. While JAAC fits this kind of 
description particularly well, many other journals have a similarly limited 
focus and so exhibit the same tendencies. Of course, JAAC has a very low 
acceptance rate, as does Faith and Philosophy. So merely because a journal 
serves a particular philosophical “niche” does not mean that the papers it 
publishes are of poor quality or that they do not receive rigorous vetting. 
Third, I would be all for having a “go to” journal for some of these discus-
sions in continental philosophy of religion, but what journal will that be? 
It certainly won’t be Faith and Philosophy, which would have to change its 
profile rather significantly to become a central journal for work in conti-
nental philosophy of religion (and, to be frank, such a change would likely 
be unwanted by most readers of and contributors to F&P). Further, I am 
not sure if Continental Philosophy Review or Philosophy Today or the Journal 
for Cultural and Religious Theory will fit that bill. It may well be that we 
need a journal specifically devoted to continental philosophy of religion.
This leads to suggestion three. Smith advises that continental philoso-
phers of religion publish with more “‘mainstream’ channels.” The problem 
is again one of enclaves or, to quote him, “alternative societies and meet-
ings” and “friendly” publishing venues. This suggestion, however, is even 
more problematic than the previous one. First, it must be remembered 
that, for instance, the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philoso-
phy (SPEP) arose in 1962 precisely because the APA program committees 
3When I contacted Merold Westphal regarding the concern about edited vol-
umes not being rigorously enough reviewed, his response was as follows: “My 
experience on the inside of Fordham and Indiana University Presses and my ex-
perience as a referee for a variety of journals strongly confirms your reply. In my 
experience, it is a myth that journal reviewing is more rigorous than refereeing 
essays for symposium volumes. While there may be nepotism in this area, it is 
far from clear that this is unique either to symposium volumes or to continental 
philosophy of religion, and I’ve seen referees be very hard on their friends in sym-
posium volumes.”
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weren’t willing to accept papers written on “continental philosophy.” It is 
a sign of currently thawing relations that the APA is much keener today 
on accepting “continental” philosophy and this is greatly to be celebrated. 
But this is a relatively new development. It wasn’t very long ago when 
sending in a Heidegger paper for an APA conference was an act of futil-
ity. And, to make matters worse, it would seem that SPEP is even today 
not particularly friendly to papers that attempt to work at the intersection 
between continental and analytic philosophy. So it goes both ways.
Of course, such a problem of “unfriendliness” was once true for Chris-
tian philosophers and the APA, and that leads me to a second problem. 
One of the main reasons for founding the SCP and its journal Faith and Phi-
losophy was precisely to provide a “friendly” venue for analytic philosophy 
of religion done by Christians. As it turns out, over the course of time, F&P 
has itself become “mainstream” and one of the premier journals of philoso-
phy of religion. But part of its original founding was certainly that of pro-
viding a “friendly” atmosphere for philosophy of religion discussions. In 
the same way that analytic philosophy of religion produced by Christians 
has come of age, I suspect continental philosophy of religion will in time 
come of age—and will thus become more mainstream. Yet we should not 
forget that Christian continental philosophers of religion face not just the 
handicap that they are Christian but also the handicap that their particular 
issues, figures, etc. are not necessarily mainstream philosophically.
Third, when Smith suggests that continental philosophers of religion 
“relinquish the ease and comfort of in-house jargon,” there is part of me 
that greets such a suggestion with a very hearty endorsement and another 
part that cautions “wait a moment.” On the one hand, there is simply no 
reason for continental philosophers of religion to resort to jargon. Indeed, 
if we are interested in having our work read as widely as possible, then 
making ourselves as clear as possible is truly desirable. Smith is quite 
right in pointing to Merold Westphal as an example of someone who 
writes in a way that is accessible to both the analytic and the continental 
traditions, and Westphal is a fine example to follow. On the other hand, 
it is not clear whether Smith is suggesting a “one-way” or a “two-way” 
street. For the problem of jargon is hardly unique to continental philoso-
phers. It would be a very welcome development were philosophers in 
both traditions willing to write in such a way as to be accessible to one 
another. However, it won’t do for the analytic philosopher to criticize the 
continental philosopher for speaking in jargon, any more than it will do 
for the Midwesterner to criticize the Southerner for “having an accent,” 
all the while thinking that people from the Midwest “have no accent.” 
We all have philosophical “accents” and, if we are really going to have a 
discussion that includes everyone, we had all better learn how to explain 
ourselves in language that everyone else can understand. Such a move 
would produce a far better and richer dialogue. Yet let us recognize from 
the beginning that such a move will not be easy—and that some on both 
“sides” will be highly resistant.
Fourth, though clearly related to my second point, one of the reasons 
for having these alternative venues is not merely that they provide a 
friendly place but that they provide a place at all. There simply isn’t enough 
room in current APA meetings to absorb the papers of SPEP, SCP, and the 
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Society for Continental Philosophy and Theology (SCPT). Even with the 
American Academy of Religion (AAR), there still aren’t enough venues 
for the work currently being done.4 Moreover, having separate SCP or 
SCPT conferences is a way to focus on a particular theme—something that 
really couldn’t be easily done through either the APA or AAR. Having 
more continental philosophy of religion papers accepted at APA confer-
ences is certainly desirable, though that will hardly significantly alter the 
current philosophical landscape.
As to suggestion four, I think literature reviews can be very desirable. 
There is no question that examining previous work on a topic or figure 
and then showing how one’s own work truly makes a contribution is both 
helpful and often needed to contextualize whatever the author is arguing. 
Indeed, analytic philosophers have discovered just how many of their cur-
rent discussions were either presaged or else played out rather similarly 
in medieval philosophy. However, I’m not sure that a literature review 
should be de rigueur for all articles.
First, if one examines many of the most influential and classic analytic 
articles, one will not find anything like a literature review. There may well 
be interaction with others who have written on the same point, but that is 
a far cry from a complete literature review. Thus, Smith is simply empiri-
cally incorrect when he says that “conversations in analytic philosophy 
always begin with a literature review.” Actually, the sentence before that 
seems to be a better appraisal of the current situation. For Smith speaks of 
“certain subfields of analytic philosophy” as having a “tight sense of the 
‘state of the art.’” It may well be that certain subfields require a literature 
review, but many articles written by analytic philosophers do not begin 
with a literature review. Having said that, though, I’m still very much in 
favor of writing in such a way that one is in dialogue with others who have 
written on a particular topic. Not only does this keep one from reinventing 
the wheel, but it also shows how a particular article is a contribution to a 
particular discussion.
However, such dialogue—and certainly the strong requirement of a 
literature review—is considerably more of a hurdle for the continental 
philosopher of religion. On the one hand, continental philosophers tend 
to be read by scholars in many different disciplines. It is not uncommon, 
then, that working on, say, Derrida’s views regarding religion may well 
require that one reads the secondary literature in such fields as anthro-
pology, communications, foreign languages (French and German, obvi-
ously, but other languages too), literary theory, sociology, and religion. 
And that list is hardly exhaustive, for it would also need to include the 
various “studies” departments that one finds at many universities. On 
the other hand, and even more daunting, any literature review worth its 
salt will have to include work done in Dutch, French, German, Italian, 
and Spanish (at a minimum). Knowing those languages well enough to 
4In the interest of full disclosure, I should state that I am a co-founder of SCPT 
and currently serve as its executive director. I am also co-chair of the Theology and 
Continental Philosophy group that is part of AAR. Both of those facts may make 
my comments less “objective,” but serving in those capacities allows me to see just 
how much demand there is for continental philosophy of religion public venues. 
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read the secondary literature is itself a rather a stiff requirement that far 
eclipses the French and/or German “competency tests” required by most 
US departments of philosophy. One could quite easily pass one of those 
tests without being able to work (in any meaningful sense) in the respec-
tive language. Then, finding the time to read the literature is even more of 
a challenge. In contrast, since most analytic philosophy is done in English, 
it is simply much easier to consult. Were one to respond to this problem 
that simply doing a literature review in English would be sufficient, then 
one would simply misunderstand the nature of a thorough literature re-
view in continental philosophy.
These reasons in no way let the continental philosopher of religion off 
the hook, but they should make clear why such literature reviews are a 
challenge that surpasses the one faced by the analytic philosopher. What 
might make more sense would be the wider use of the Literaturbericht that 
one finds in the German tradition: in such an essay, one surveys the litera-
ture on a particular topic and lays out the various views. Such essays are 
simply literature reviews, rather than articles that begin with a literature 
review and then explain how the author’s view relates to the others.
In suggestion five, Smith advises that continental philosophers of reli-
gion “move beyond ‘victimhood’ and embrace critique.” First, how could 
one argue against embracing thoughtful critique? Yes, there is a “victim” 
mentality among some continental philosophers. But, then, some of us 
have had to work in contexts in which there simply hasn’t been much in 
the way of “objective” critique of our work. In other words, some of that 
critique has been “ideologically driven.” But, if someone (whether conti-
nental or analytically oriented) has substantive, non-ideological critique, 
then “let’s hear it”! However, I think the real problem that continental 
philosophers face is finding analytic philosophers who are truly willing 
to take the time to understand what we are saying, even if we are saying 
it as clearly as we are able. It seems safe to say that we need to cultivate 
a culture in which there is an openness to dialogue on both sides. That is a 
goal to be achieved, though, not at all the present reality.
Finally, there is every reason to embrace “authentic pluralism.” Smith 
seems to suggest that it doesn’t exist in continental philosophy of religion. 
His examples of exclusion include work inflected by the Derridean no-
tion of “religion without religion,” the thought of Vattimo, and the (nega-
tive) response to Radical Orthodoxy (for more specifics, consult footnote 
twenty-two of Smith’s text). In effect, Smith’s point is that precisely those 
who preach the gospel of “difference” don’t actually have much room for 
it, especially if it comes in the form of Christian orthodoxy. Regarding that 
point, I must leave it to the reader to decide whether such supposed open-
ness really doesn’t exist; one could easily reel off a long list of names who 
are either orthodox Christians themselves or very much open to orthodox 
Christianity.5 Yet, even if there is a lack of openness in certain quarters, 
Smith’s portrayal of continental philosophy of religion seems “monolithic” 
5Besides putting myself squarely in that group, one could name Jean-Louis 
Chrétien, Louis Dupre, Kevin Hart, Richard Kearney, Jean-Luc Marion, Adriaan 
Peperzak, Robert Sokolowski, Merold Westphal, and Norman Wirzba. This is just 
the beginning of such a list.
456 Faith and Philosophy
in a way that simply does not reflect continental philosophy of religion as 
practiced both on this continent and the continent of Europe. Instead, this 
is a very lively and open exchange that includes players from a wide vari-
ety of perspectives. Even though some of those perspectives are critical of 
the others, there isn’t anything like the “creeping hegemony” that bothers 
Smith. Sure, there may be those who are allergic to orthodox Christianity, 
but that is hardly more of a problem in continental philosophy of religion 
than it is in analytic philosophy of religion. Christian analytic philoso-
phers of religion have long had to deal with such opposition.
As should be clear, all of what I’ve said so far is to put Smith’s sug-
gestions in perspective. As such, it should be taken simply as continuing 
a conversation. There is clearly much more to be said. But let me con-
clude by summarizing what I’ve noted above. First, in full agreement with 
Smith, being “rigorous, pluralistic, and rooted in the history of philoso-
phy” should be a desideratum for all graduate departments, not merely 
ones that specialize in continental philosophy. Second, peer-review is al-
ways going to be the “gold standard” of philosophy, but I am not sure that 
such review comes only from publishing in journals, nor does publishing 
in journals necessarily guarantee high-quality peer-review. Third, if any 
particular philosophical group or specialty is being insular merely to “es-
cape” wider critique, then that is surely problematic. However, there may 
be good reasons for having publishing venues that are read largely by 
those in a particular sub-specialty, and those venues need not lack rigor 
or be enclavish. Fourth, there is much to commend the literature review, 
though it needs to be recognized that such a review is not necessarily stan-
dard for analytic philosophy and that it presents a particular challenge 
for continental philosophers of religion. Fifth, continental philosophers of 
religion should indeed “embrace critique,” but we need philosophers to 
step up to the plate and provide truly thoughtful, non-ideological critique. 
Finally, authentic pluralism is an excellent goal for any discipline. How-
ever, pluralism does not mean that one does not take stands on particular 
issues or that one welcomes all voices without criticism.
In conclusion, for pushing us not necessarily to begin (for the conversa-
tion has been going on for quite some time) but to go much further, Smith 
is certainly to be thanked. In turn, I can only add: “let the conversation 
continue.”
Wheaton College
